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 Determinants of Financial 
Derivative Disclosures in an Emerging 
Economy: A Stewardship Theory 
Perspective 
 
 Hima Bindu Kota1 and B. Charumathi2 
 
Abstract 
The accounting system in India is undergoing a significant change. With the notification of 
Companies (Indian Accounting Standards) Rules 2015, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs in 
India converged the Indian Accounting Standards (Ind AS) with International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) which was applied in a phased manner from 1 April 2016 beginning 
with large companies whose net worth was equal to or exceeded INR 5 billion, followed by its 
implementation for smaller companies with net worth between 2.5 billion to 5 billion thereafter. 
Among other accounting standards, Financial Instruments Standards Ind AS 32, 109 and 107 that 
defines, recognises, measures and specifies disclosure norms of financial instruments including 
financial derivatives were introduced. Warren Buffet very famously called derivatives, “financial 
weapons of mass destruction,” and giving credence to his views, time and again, financial as well 
as non-financial firms in India and around the world have sustained losses due to the usage of 
financial derivatives. Over the years, the capital markets have changed, and business models 
have become more challenging with complex sources of risk and uncertainty which has 
transformed risk management into a sophisticated art. This complex and ever-changing business 
environment has brought to the fore the necessity and importance of developing reliable and 
relevant disclosure norms to help protect all stakeholders, as derivatives, due to their underlying 
complex nature, can be a significant source of systematic risk. This is also reiterated, with 
shareholders and investors stepping up the demand for increased financial disclosure. This 
empirical study models the factors that determine Financial Derivative Disclosure of Indian non-
financial firms The study develops a self-constructed unweighted Financial Derivative 
Disclosure Index (FDDI) to measure the derivative disclosure. The sample represents companies 
from Nifty 50, out of which banking and financial services companies were removed. Using 
multiple regression model, this study modelled the corporate governance factors which 
determine derivative disclosure. The factors identified were presence of usage of derivatives, 
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size, foreign income, presence of risk management committee, institutional shareholding and 
binary variable for family business. The results show that the stewardship theory explains the 
determinants of financial derivative disclosure in Indian context, and promoters act as stewards 
and guide their firms to improve their financial derivative disclosures. 
 
JEL Classification: G32 
Keywords: Accounting Standards 32, 109 & 107, Financial Derivative Disclosure Index 
(FDDI), Financial Derivative Disclosure Quotient (FDDQ), derivative usage, Nifty 50. 
 
Introduction 
According to the former Governor of Federal Reserve Greenspan (1999), the stupendous 
increase in the usage of financial derivatives by firms, world over, has marked the most 
extraordinary development in the field of finance. Although firms use derivatives in most of the 
industries, their usage may be different. For example, non-financial firms in India, as in the rest 
of the world, hedge themselves against any one or more of the following market risks: adverse 
movements in interest rates, commodity prices, foreign exchange rates and equity values.   On 
the other hand, banking and financial firms may use derivatives both as dealers and end-users. 
With the well-publicized losses from derivatives sustained by both financial and non-financial 
firms in the past, financial boards across the world have come under the pressure of regulators to 
create new rules for reliable and relevant disclosures. Moreover, shareholders and investors have 
also demanded increased financial disclosure. With the increasing sophistication of financial 
products and services and increased use of derivatives for risk mitigation and trading in India, 
Accounting Standards (AS) 30, 31 and 32 came into effect on or after 1st April 2009. The 
standards were recommendationsonly for two years and were supposed to be mandatory for 
accounting periods commencing on or after April 1, 2011, although by 2015, AS 30 and 31 were 
replace by Ind AS 109 and 107. In the aftermath of the global financial crisis and significant 
losses on derivatives transactions announced by Indian companies in the past, a study on the 
disclosure of derivative usage and its determinants is especially significant. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Annual reports are an important source of information about the derivative activities by any firm. 
Several users like investors, shareholders, lenders, and analysts of financial statements can use 
derivative disclosures to understand derivatives activities better and hence take correct decisions. 
Academics, accountants and analysts have long debated over how to show complex financial 
instruments like derivatives in the financial statements. Disclosure failure can misrepresent the 
risk taken by these firms and expose unaware shareholders and investors to huge losses. This 
phenomenon has been observed in many firms including Proctor & Gamble and Barings Bank. 
The fact that organizations can display unethical behaviour can be seen by financial scandals of 
well-known firms like Enron, Arthur Anderson, WorldCom and that of Satyam, in India. These 
scandals have shaken public confidence in how businesses are managed, creating concern about 
ethics and corporate governance. With the well-publicized derivative losses sustained by both 
financial and non-financial firms over the past few years, financial boards across the world have 
come under the pressure of regulators to create new rules for reliable and relevant disclosures. 
Additionally, shareholders and investors have demanded increased financial disclosure (Feay 
&Abdullah, 2001). From another view point, understanding the reason for voluntary disclosure 
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by firms is beneficial to both the preparers and users of accounting information as well as to 
accounting policymakers (Meek, Gray & Roberts, 1995).  
 
To contribute towards better disclosures and transparency, several countries have come up with 
accounting standards for derivatives.  The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) of the 
United States has issued FASB 133 and 137 and FAS 161, Australia has issued AASB 1033. In 
addition, FRS 13 in United Kingdom, CICA 3862 in Canada, IAS 32 and 39 in Portugal and 
MASB ED 24 in Malaysia have been issued to improve the corporate reporting standards in 
derivatives and hedging instruments. 
 
Studies on Derivative Disclosure  
 
Complete compliance to disclosure norms is not a world-wide phenomenon. Several studies 
show that compliance to derivative disclosure norms is incomplete (Chalmers, 2001; Chalmers & 
Godfrey, 2000; Blankley et at, 2000; Roulsone, 1999; Hafiz, 2003). Among different nations, it 
was found that disclosures in British and American firms are higher after examining the 
disclosure of seven countries namely, United States, United Kingdom, France, Japan, Sweden, 
Netherlands and West Germany (Barrett, 1976), 
 
However, with the implementation of mandatory standards on financial instruments, there had 
been a marked improvement in the derivative disclosures (Edward   & Eller, 1995, 1996; Dunne, 
Helliar, Power, Mallin, Ow-Yong and Moir, 2004; Woods and Marginson, 2004; and Hassan, 
Saleh & Rahman, 2007). The usefulness of the compulsory accounting and reporting practice for 
derivatives has attracted considerable academic attention since they were issued.  
 
In the accounting literature, the studies in relation to the assessment of derivative disclosures 
have developed into two branches. Firstly, some studies (Edwards and Eller, 1996; Roulstone, 
1999; Blankley et al., 2000, 2002; Bhamornsiri & Schroeder, 2004; Lajili & Zehgal, 2005; 
Dunne et al., 2007; Lopes & Rodrigues, 2008) have examined the quality of derivative 
disclosures by evaluating the response of listed companies to the mandated disclosure 
requirements for derivatives. These researchers intend to find out the answers about whether the 
mandated derivative disclosure provisions actually achieve the expectation of accounting 
authorities, by demanding the listed companies to provide more information regarding derivative 
related activities in their annual reports. Generally speaking, these studies indicate that the 
quoted companies are able to prepare both qualitative and quantitative information about the 
derivative usage and associated market risk in accordance with the basic accounting and 
reporting rules in their annual reports. Nevertheless, they are unwilling to provide sufficient 
detailed information such as the assumptions of quantitative techniques and corporate risk 
management activities. Hence, it can be argued that although the implementation of the 
compulsory disclosure requirements improves the reported information about use of derivatives, 
the supervisory authorities still have a task to inspire the reporting companies to disclose more 
information with greater details.  
 
Another strand of studies focuses on the effect of information disclosure on the behaviour of 
financial market aggregates such as stock price, stock returns and trading volume. These 
researches (McNally/McAnally, 1996; Nelson, 1996; Barth et al., 1996; Schrand, 997; Rajgopla, 
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1999; Eccher et al., 1996; Venkatachalam, 1996; Barton, 2001; Seow and Tam, 2002; Jorion, 
2002; Liensmeir et al, 2002; Jorion, 2002; Linsmeir et al., 2002; Ahmed et al., 2004; Liu et al., 
2004; Eric et al., 2004; Wang et al., 2005; Koonce et al., 2005; Reynolds-Moehrle, 2005; Richie 
et al, 2005; Chipalkatti and Datar, 2006; Ahmed et al, 2006; Zhang, 2009; Ameer, 2009; and 
Perignon & Smith, 2010) attempt to explain empirically observed phenomena in the association 
between the derivative related disclosures and market responses. Overall, the findings of these 
studies are mixed even contrary. Some researchers (McAnally, 1996; Barth et al., 1996; Eccher 
et al., 1996; Venkatachalam, 1996; Schrand, 1997; Rajgopal, 1999; Seow and Tam, 2002; Jorion, 
2002; Linsmeier et al., 2002; Ahmed et al., 2004; Lin et al., 2004; Eric et al., 2004; Wang et al., 
2005; Ahmed et al., 2005; Ameer, 2009; Zhang, 2009) provide the empirical evidence to prove 
the value relevance of compulsory derivative accounting and reporting regulations to investors' 
assessment of the corporate risk profile while some empirical studies (Nelson, 1996; Wang et al., 
2005; Chipalkatti & Datar, 2006; Perignon and Smith, 2010) demonstrate that there is no 
relationship between the disclosed derivative information and the market response. Some (Lehn, 
1997; AICPA, 1998; Hodder et al., 2001; Kawaller, 2004; Reinstein & Lander, 2000) argue that 
the complicated accounting and reporting treatments for derivatives have caused difficulties for 
investors in valuating corporate derivative activities, and even a few studies (Logan & 
Montgomery, 1997; Koonce et al., 2005) indicate that the disclosures following the mandated 
derivative related requirements have been misunderstood and adversely affected investors' 
assessments in a company's risk profile and associated derivative activities. In addition, the 
restrictive and complex derivative related standards, such as SFAS 133, have made the reporting 
entities hard to understand and caused a series of significant problems in the use of derivatives 
and smooth earnings volatility (Osterland, 2000; AFP, 2001; Barton, 2001; Leib, 2001; Richie et 
al., 2005). Such mixed and contrary results are coincident with the findings achieved by the first 
stream that the compliance with derivative related standards is mixed and the standard has not 
adequately achieved the desired level of financial transparency on the use of derivative financial 
instruments as expected (Bhamornsiri & Schroeder, 2004).  
 
Further, there are some studies that have examined the relationship between the extent of 
derivative disclosure and certain firm-specific variables. Studies have shown positive and 
significant association between derivative disclosure and size (Mapurunga, Ponte, Coelho & de 
Meneses, 2011; Lopes & Rodrigues, 2007; Hassan, Percy & Goodwin-Stewart, 2006-2007, 
Hassan, Salah & Rahman, 2007 and Hafiz, 2003); type of auditor (Lopes & Rodrigues, 2007); 
earnings (Mapurunga, Ponte, Coelho & de Meneses, 2011; Hassan, Percy & Goodwin-Stewart, 
2006-2007); board characteristics like existence of risk management committee and more 
independent board composition (Hassan, Salah & Rahman, 2007; Hossain, 2008); listing status 
(Lopes & Rodrigues, 2007); reputation costs of managers and firms (Chalmers and Godfrey, 
2004); debt ratio (Hassan, Percy & Goodwin-Stewart, 2006-2007; Hassan, Salah & Rahman, 
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Determinants of Derivative Disclosure - A Stewardship Theory Framework 
 
Role of a Promoter 
 
Stewardship Theory is a relatively new concept (Karns, 2011) and has been developed to explain 
the rational behaviour of management (Donaldson & Davis, 1991). According to Hernandez 
(2012) and Davis et al. (1997), stewardship is the “extent to which an individual willingly 
subjugates his or her personal interests to act in protection of others’ long‐term welfare.” This 
theory holds that there is no conflict of interest between managers and owners (Donaldson, 
1990), no inherent problem of executive control (Donaldson, 2008) and there is effective 
coordination between the two parties and the focus is on achieving organisation’s goals rather 
that self-interests (Van Slyke, 2007).   
 
India is a very unique country in its structure of business. In most of the organisations, the 
promoter or the promoter group is the main decision taker. This is because the financial 
organisations in India are very passive and do not play any major role in decision taking (Verma, 
1997). By this virtue, the promoter and the promoter group become the dominant shareholders 
and the rest the minority shareholders. The principal-agent problems are virtually non-existent in 
India and conflicts of interest between the owners and managers are not likely, as the owners are 
in the helm of their businesses, hiring managers to perform key tasks in their businesses (Ahmed 
& Nicholls, 1994), showing less difference between those who own and those who manage. 
They are the Owner-Managers, performing the dual role of also managing their businesses and 
are the stewards of their businesses. Therefore, theory of stewardship fits well in the Indian 
context. It is hypothesized that in an emerging economy, owner-managers of large organizations 
guide their business for higher productivity (Durand and Vargas, 2003), higher performance 
(Anderson et al., 2003; Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Villalonga & Amit, 2006) and better regulatory 
compliance in some areas (Chen, Chen & Cheng, 2008). However, Ali, Chen and Radhakrishnan 
(2007) report that family firms have fewer disclosures about corporate governance practices. 
 
Since the sample of the study contains very large organizations in India, it is the duty of the 
Owner-Manager or the promoter group to have better adherence to regulations and have better 
disclosures to have better reputation in the financial markets (Skinner, 1994). Therefore, firms 
with higher promoter or promoter group holding will have higher derivative disclosures.  
 
 Presence of Institutional Holding  
 
The role of institutional investors has become more active since the global financial crises and 
other controversies like tax avoidance and scarcity of fossil fuels. Several studies have identified 
the role of investors as stewards who hold the companies, in which they hold a stake, responsible 
and accountable (Kay, 2012; Myners 2001; Financial Reporting Council, 2012).   
 
The literature review on the role of institutional investors is divided into areas concerning their 
role and behaviour. Several studies have focused on the “monitoring” aspects of institutional 
investors by engaging with the management to achieve the organizational objectives (Shleifer & 
Vishny 1986, 1997; Dobrzynski 1993 and Monks & Minow 1995;) which have helped 
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organisations to improve operating performance and profitability (Dimson, Karakas, & Li, 2015) 

























Overall, the prior researches in relation to the impacts of compulsory derivative related 
accounting and reporting requirements were mostly based upon the sample from developed 
countries with mature financial derivative markets. In particular, most of the studies on risk 
management and disclosures have been directed to the U.S. setting with an emphasis on financial 
risk disclosures. However, till now, very limited studies have been conducted so as to 
specifically address accounting and reporting for derivatives in India. 
 
In India, corporate disclosure studies have been conducted in several areas like voluntary 
disclosures in non-financial firms (Charumathi & Ramesh, 2013; Sarkar, 2011; and Varghese, 
2012), banks (Hossain and Reaz, 2007), insurance companies (Charumathi & Nithya, 2012), 
environmental disclosures (Joshi, Suwaidan and Kumar, 2011); and Sen, Mukherjee and 
Pattnayak, 2011,  disclosure of intangibles (Ragini, 2012), intellectual capital disclosures 
(Bhasin, 2011) and Singh and Kansal, 2011, online and website reporting disclosures 
(Charumathi & Surulivel, 2010; and Garg and Divya, 2013), EVA disclosures (Kaur and Narang, 
2010) and corporate governance disclosure studies (Balasubramaniam, Black and Khanna, 2008; 
Bhanumurthy and Dessai, 2010; Bhasin, 2010; Charumathi, 2008 and Charumathi, 2010).  
 
Apart from general disclosure studies, several researchers have also studied the attributes of 
disclosure like timeliness of financial reporting (Charumathi and Murlikrishnan, 2011); 
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disclosures (Bhayani, 2012; and Nandi and Ghosh, 2012) and extent of disclosure (Hossain, 
2008).  
 
On the basis of the literature review done, there seems to be no study on the determinants of 
disclosure of derivatives by non-financial Indian firms. Hence, the present study intends to fill 
this gap 
 
OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY 
The objective of the study is to develop an original index viz., Financial Derivative Disclosure 




Sample: The sample taken for studying the derivative disclosure is 50 companies of CNX Nifty. 
CNX Nifty is a well-diversified 50 stock index accounting for 22 sectors of the economy. The 
stocks that make the NIFTY index represent the prime companies in India and they are leaders in 
the stock exchange in terms of the derivative trading volume and the market capitalization. CNX 
Nifty stocks represent about 67.2% of the total free float market capitalization of the universe of 
the stocks traded on NSE as on September 28, 2012 and is a true reflection of the Indian stock 
market. NSE is India’s largest and world’s third largest stock exchange in terms of transactions. 
Out of 50 companies chosen as sample, 11 firms are in banking or financial services sector and 
were removed from the sample. The total of 36 firms was finally studied.  
Sources of Data Collection: The study primarily used secondary data. Various secondary 
resources include annual reports, National Stock Exchange’s official website www.nseindia.com, 
websites of individual firms, Confederation of Indian Industries (CII) library, databases like 
Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE) Prowess and Business Beacon, annual report 
library services like Sansco Services. In addition, Accounting Standards (AS) 32, 109 and 107 
were studied extensively. A number of research papers, working papers and financial dailies 
were also referred to.  
Variables of the Study 
Variables for Constructing Financial Derivative Disclosure Index (FDDI) 
Table 1 shows the variables of the Financial Derivative Disclosure Index (FDDI). 
  






Variables for constructing Financial Derivative Disclosure Index (FDDI) 
1. Risk Management Objective 
2. Recognition of the type of hedge 
3. Separate disclosure for each type of hedge (cash flow/fair value/hedges 
of net investment in foreign operations) 
4. Disclosure regarding the future expectation of cash flows and hedge 
reserve account 
5. Disclosure regarding gains/losses and ineffectiveness 
6. Qualitative Disclosures 
7. Quantitative Disclosures 
8 Valuation 
 
Variables for Studying the Determinants of Financial Derivative Disclosure 
Table 2 shows the variables for studying the determinants of financial derivative disclosure.  
 
Table 2 
Variables for Studying the Determinants of Derivative Disclosure  
 Purpose/Categor
y 



















 To measure the 
disclosure of 
derivative activity 






It is the ratio of the actual 
score based on the FDDI 






















Derivative Usage  DER Log of the notional value of 
total derivatives (including 
interest rate and foreign 
exchange derivatives) used 
by a firm 
 
Size of the firm SIZE Log of the size of the firm  
Multinationality FXINC Ratio of the foreign 






INSTI The percentage of the 
institutional holding in the 
firm. 
Stewardship Theory 
Risk Management  Binary variable that takes Stewardship Theory 
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Committee RMC the value of 1 if risk 
management committee is 
present otherwise zero 
Family Business FB Binary variable takes the 
value of 1 if the 
promoter/promoter family 
has a majority share  and is 
actively involved in 
management of the 
business otherwise zero 
Stewardship Theory 
 
Methodology for constructing Financial Derivative Disclosure Index (FDDI): Content 
Analysis 
 
According to Krippendorff (1980), content analysis is a research technique for making 
replicable and valid inferences from data to their context. Berelson (1952) defines content 
analysis as a research technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the 
manifest content of communication. Similarly, Carney (1972) describes it as a research 
technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified 
characteristics of messages.  Content analysis is mainly of two types: i) conceptual content 
analysis, where the frequency of certain key words or concepts are studied and ii) relational 
content analysis examines the relationships among concepts in a text. Conceptual content 
analysis is frequently used in disclosure literature. Content analysis can also be categorized as i) 
partial and ii) comprehensive. The content analysis used in the present study is conceptual and 
partial. 
  
This study constructed an unweighted Financial Derivatives Disclosure Index (FDDI) based on a 
thorough and rigorous study of the existing regulatory framework for Indian listed companies. 
This index is first of its kind in India. The components examined include Accounting standards 
32, 109 and 107. A manual content analysis is done by studying 288 annual reports (36 annual 
reports for each year for eight years from 2010-11 to 2016-17). Using the FDDI, this study 
computed Financial Derivate Disclosure Quotient (FDDQ) based on the derivative disclosure 
information in the annual reports during 2010-11 to 2016-17. FDDI is constructed by studying 
various aspects as mentioned in Table 1. Table 3 gives the details of the variables used in 
constructing the FDDI.  
  





Table 3: Financial Derivatives Disclosure Index (FDDI) 
I. Risk Management Objective Score 
Does the company identify the risk management objective and strategy for undertaking the hedge? 1 
II. Recognition  
Does the company recognise usage of fair value hedge or cash flow hedge or hedges of a net 
investment? 
1 
III. Items of Disclosure  
III. (a) Whether the company discloses separately for each type of hedge (fair value/cash 
flow/hedges of net investment in foreign operations) 
 
A description of each type of hedge 1 
A description of the financial instruments designated as hedging instruments and their fair value at the 
reporting date. 
1 
The nature of the risk being hedged. 1 
III. (b) For cash flow hedges, a company should disclose  
The periods when the cash flows are expected to occur and when they are expected to affect profit or 
loss. 
1 
A description of any forecast transaction for which hedge accounting had previously been used, but 
which is expected to occur. 
1 
The amount that was recognized in the appropriate equity account (hedge Reserve Account) and 
included in the statement of profit and loss for the period, showing the amount included in each line 
item in the statement. 
1 
The amount that was removed from appropriate equity account (Hedge Reserve Account) during the 
period and included in the initial cost or carrying amount of a non-financial asset or non-financial 
liability  
1 
III. (c) A company should disclose separately  
In fair value hedges, gains and losses: (i) on the hedging instrument: and  1 
(ii) on the hedged item attributable to the hedged risk. 1 
The ineffectiveness recognised in the statement of profit and loss that arises from cash flow hedges. 1 
The ineffectiveness recognized in the statement of profit and loss that arises from hedges of net 
investments in foreign operations 
1 
IV. Qualitative Disclosures  
The company should disclose the exposure to risk and how they arise. 1 
Its objectives, policies and processes for managing the risk and the methods used to measure the risk. 1 
Any changes in 1 or 2 from the previous period 1 
V. Quantitative Disclosures  
Summary quantitative data about its exposure to that risk at the reporting date. 1 
The disclosures required by paragraphs 36-42 of AS 32, to the extent not provided in 1. 1 
VI. Valuation  
The method and when a valuation technique is used, the assumptions applied in determining fair 
values of each class of financial assets or financial liabilities. 
1 
Should disclose whether fair values are determined directly by reference to published price quotations 
or are estimated using a valuation technique.  
1 
Total Score 20 
 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
Using the FDDI, the derivative disclosure of different Indian non-financial firms is measured and 
the FDDQ is shown in Table 4. 
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Table  4: Disclosure of Derivative Information by Indian Non-Financial Firms 
S. No. Firm Name 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
 
2017 
1 ACC 0 0.2 0.15 0.2 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
2 Ambuja Cements 0.05 0 0.05 0.1 0 0 0.05 0.05 
3 Bajaj Auto 0.05 0.1 0.25 0.3 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 
4 BHEL 0.05 0 0 0.05 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 
5 BPCL 0.15 0.15 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.25 0.25 
6 Bharti Airtel 0 0.3 0.2 0.25 0.35 0.35 0.4 0.4 
7 Cairn 0.2 0 0.15 0.2 0 0.15 0.1 0.1 
8 Cipla 0 0.1 0.15 0.1 0.1 0.05 0.1 0.1 
9 Dr. Reddy 0.4 0.55 0.4 0.4 0.55 0.7 0.7 0.7 
10 GAIL 0 0 0 0 0 0.05 0.1 0.1 
11 Grasim 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.3 0.3 
12 HCL Tech 0.15 0.45 0.55 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.55 0.55 
13 Hero  0 0 0 0.05 0.05 0.15 0.25 0.25 
14 Hindalco 0.35 0.4 0.35 0.65 0.65 0.6 0.65 0.65 
15 Infosys 0.25 0.35 0.25 0.3 0.25 0.35 0.35 0.45 
16 ITC 0.15 0.25 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.35 
17 Jaiprakash 0 0.2 0.1 0 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.025 
18 Jindal Steel 0.05 0.15 0.1 0.2 0.05 0.25 0.05 0.1 
19 L&T 0.2 0.45 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.45 0.45 0.45 
20 M&M 0.2 0.55 0.35 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.45 0.5 
21 Maruti 0.3 0 0 0 0.15 0.55 0.45 0.45 
22 NTPC 0 0 0 0 0.05 0.1 0.1 0.1 
23 ONGC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.025 
24 Power Grid 0 0 0 0 0.05 0.1 0.1 0.075 
25 Reliance Comm 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.175 
26 Reliance 0.2 0.3 0.25 0.2 0.25 0.25 0.2 0.2 
27 Reliance Infra 0.2 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.15 0.15 0.2 0.2 
28 Reliance Power 0 0 0 0 0.05 0.05 0.1 0.1 
29 Sesa Goa 0 0 0.35 0 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.25 
30 SAIL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.2 
31 Sun Pharma 0 0 0.05 0.2 0.2 0.05 0.05 0.05 
32 TCS 0.4 0.55 0.55 0.5 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.6 
33 Tata Motors 0.2 0.2 0.45 0.45 0.35 0.5 0.5 0.55 
34 Tata Power 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.25 0.25 
35 Tata Steel 0 0.25 0.25 0.3 0.15 0.5 0.55 0.6 
36 Wipro 0.25 0.45 0.5 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.55 
N 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 
Min. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max. 0.4 0.55 0.55 0.65 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.65 
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Mean 0.12 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.22 0.26 0.28 0.30 
Std. Dev 0.13 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 
Note: FDDQ is computed using FDDI. 
  
   
MEASURING DERIVATIVE DISCLOSURE 
 To measure the derivative disclosure, this study first develops a Financial Derivative Disclosure 
Index (FDDI) based on the variables mentioned in Table 1 and Financial Derivative Disclosure 
Quotient (FDDQ) is computed using the formula mentioned. This section establishes the 
reliability and validity of FDDI using Cronbach’s Alpha and Pearson’s correlation. Further, this 
section also finds whether derivative disclosure by firms has increased during the period of 
study.    
Table 5: Testing Reliability of Financial Derivative Disclosure Index (FDDI) 
Cronbach’s Alpha 0.872 
N 281 
Note: Results computed using SPSS 20.0 
 
 
Reliability and Validity of any index needs to be checked for using the same for any further 
study. Table 5 shows the reliability test of FDDI. It is found that the Cronbach’s Alpha value is 
0.872, suggesting that the FDDI is reliable. Table 6 tests the validity of FDDI. For checking the 
validity of the FDDI, the study tests the correlation between the disclosure scores measured by 
FDDQ and the notional value of the derivatives used (TOTALDER). A high correlation between 
FDDQ and TOTALDER suggests that the FDDI measures the disclosure of derivatives by the 
firms, which it intends to measure. It is found that the correlation between FDDQ and 




Table 6: Testing Validity of FDDI Using Pearson’s Correlation 
  TOTALDER 
FDDQ Pearson Correlationship .648*** 
 Sig. (2 tailed) .000 
 N 281 
***Correlation is significant at 1% level 
Note: Results computed using SPSS 20.0 
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IMPROVEMENT IN DERIVATIVE DISCLOSURE OVER TIME 
 
 





(N = 135) 
2012-2015 

























Note: Results computed using SPSS 20.0 
 
 
Table 7 shows the results of independent t-test for the two different time periods 2010-2013 and 
2014-2017 and the following observations are made. It is evident that the mean FDDQ for 2010-
2013 is at 0.1859 and that of 2014-2017 is at 0.2708. The F value stands at 14.817 with a 
significance value of 0.000. Since the p-value is at 0.031 for Levene’s test, we conclude that we 
have unequal variances and look at equal variances not assumed column. It is concluded that 
FDDQ in 2014-2017 is significantly higher than in 2010-2013 since the significance value is at 
0.000 and is significant at 1% significance level. Thus, there is a significant difference in the 
derivative disclosure of firms during the time periods, viz., 2010-2013 and 2014-2017.  
 
Determinants of Financial Derivatives Disclosure Quotient (FDDQ) 
 
Table 8 shows the descriptive statistics for studying the determinants of Financial Derivative 
Disclosure Quotient (FDDQ) 
 
 
Table 8: Descriptive Statistics for studying the Determinants of 
Financial Derivative Disclosure Quotient (FDDQ) 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
FDDQ .2295 .19816 269 
TOTALDER 6.9008 4.98562 269 
SIZE 12.2659 .98790 269 
FXINC 23.4892 30.30147 269 
INSTI 3.3465 .51320 269 
RMC .4647 .49968 269 
FB .6134 .48788 269 
Note: Results computed using SPSS 20.0 
 
Kota & Charumathi | Determinants of Financial Derivative Disclosures in an Emerging Economy 
 
75 
Tables 8 and 9 also shows the model summary, ANOVA results and the coefficients of 






Table 9: Table showing the Determinants of Financial Derivative Disclosure 
Quotient (FDDQ) 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
t-Stat (Sig) t-Stat (Sig) t-Stat (Sig) t-Stat (Sig) 
TOTALDE
R 7.262*** 7.972*** 5.146*** 5.499*** 
SIZE 
1.950* .240 4.383*** 2.067** 
FXINC 
5.777*** 5.204*** 5.089*** 4.576*** 
INSTI 
2.836** 2.001** .587 .265 
RMC 
4.942*** 3.897*** 4.686*** 3.849*** 
FB 
3.632*** 2.803** 3.798*** 3.151** 
     
Adjusted R2 .542 .562 .630 .640 
F(Sig) 53.961*** 27.445*** 22.734*** 18.024*** 
D-W 
Statistic 
2.058 2.241 2.252 2.362 
N 269 269 269 269 
     
Year Fixed 
Effects 




No No Yes Yes 
***sig at 1%, **sig at 5%, *sig at 10% 
All results are consistent with Breusch-Pagan Test for Heteroscedasticity 
AABFJ  |  Volume 12, no. 3, 2018 
 
76 
Table 9 shows four different models. Model 1 does not take into account both the industry and 
year fixed effects; model 2 shows only the year fixed effects; model 3 discusses only the industry 
fixed effects and model 4 takes into account both industry and year fixed effects.  
The adjusted R-square for model 1 is fairly high at 54.2% and the model is significant at 1% 
significance levels. The Durbin-Watson statistic is 2.058 showing that there is no auto-
correlation.  
 
It can also be seen that there is a positive relationship between FDDQ and TOTALDER. The 
coefficients of all the four models are positive at 7.262 (p = 0.000), 7.972 (p =0.000), 5.146 (p = 
0.003) and 5.499(p= 0.004), respectively and are significant at 1 per cent level. Thus, there is a 
positive and significant relation between FDDQ and TOTALDER. It can also be seen that there 
is a positive relationship between FDDQ and Size. The coefficients of all the four models are 
positive at 1.950 (p = 0.052), 0.240 (p =0.810), 4.383 (p = 0.000) and 2.067 (p= 0.040), 
respectively. In models 1 and 4, size is significant at 5% and in model 3, it is significant at 1% 
level. In model 2, size is an insignificant determinant of FDDQ. In general, there is a positive 
and significant relation between FDDQ and SIZE. The relationship between forex income 
(FXINC) and FDDQ is also positive and the coefficients of all the four models are positive at 
5.777 (p = 0.000), 5.204 (p =0.000), 5.089 (p = 0.000) and 4.576 (p= 0.000), respectively and are 
significant at 1 per cent level. Thus, there is a positive and significant relation between FDDQ 
and FXINC. 
 
It can be noted that there is a positive and significant relationship between institutional holding 
(INSTI) and FDDQ in models 1 and 2. The coefficients are positive at 2.836 (p=.005) and 2.001 
(p =.046) and are significant at 5% level. Thus, there is a positive and significant relation 
between FDDQ and INSTI. There is a positive relationship between the presence of risk 
management committee (RMC) and FDDQ. The coefficients are positive in all the four models 
at 4.942 (p = 0.000), 3.897 (p =0.000), 4.686 (p = 0.003) and 3.849 (p= 0.004), respectively and 
are significant at 1 per cent level. Thus, there is a positive and significant relation between 
FDDQ and RMC.  
 
Family owned (FB) business also has a positive and significant relation with FDDQ. The co-
efficients are positive in all the four models at 3.632 (p = 0.000), 2.803 (p =0.005), 3.798 (p = 
0.000) and 3.151 (p= 0.002), respectively and are significant at both 1 per cent and 5 per cent 
level. Thus, there is a positive and significant relation between FDDQ and FB  
 
Table 10: Table showing the Correlation between Financial Derivative Disclosure Quotient 
(FDDQ) and Company Specific Determinants 
 FDDQ TOTADER SIZE FXINC INSTI RMC FB 
FDDQ 1.000 .657*** .015 .477*** .209*** .276*** .363*** 
TOTALDER .657*** 1.000 .051 .409*** .260*** .107** .422*** 
SIZE .015 .051 1.000 -.221*** -.168** .197** -.325*** 
FXINC .477*** .409*** -.221 1.000 -.054 .104** .191** 
INSTI .209*** .260*** -.168 -.054 1.000 -.051 .101** 
RMC .276*** .107** .197 .104** -.051 1.000 -.117** 
FB .363*** .422*** -.325 .191** .101** -.117** 1.000 
***sig at 1%, **sig at 5%, *sig at 10% 
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Table 10 shows the Pearson correlation between the dependent, independent and control 
variables. The results show that there is a strong correlation between FDDQ and TOTALDER at 
0.657, FXINC at 0.477, INSTI at 0.209, RMC at 0.276 and FB at 0.363 and are significant at 1% 
significance level. 
 
Testing for multicollinearity. Table 11 shows the collinearity statistics and collinearity 
diagnostics and shows that VIFs of all the independent variables are less than 10 and in fact very 
close to the value of one. The tolerance is also greater than 0.5 in all the cases. This also shows 
that the problem of multicollinearity does not exist. The condition index for most of the variables 
is less than 30, which suggest that there is no serious multicollinearity problem. 
 
 
Table 11: Testing Multicollinearity 
Collinearity Statistics 
Model Tolerance VIF 
TOTALDER .554 1.804 
SIZE .711 1.407 
FXINC .710 1.408 
INSTI .833 1.200 
RMC .925 1.081 
FB .679 1.474 
Collinearity Diagnostics 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue Condition Index 
1 5.404 1.000 
2 .591 3.023 
3 .523 3.214 
4 .282 4.378 
5 .181 5.464 
6 .017 17.762 




Very interesting results have come out of the analysis in the Indian context. The disclosure of 
financial derivatives activity by any firm in India is although desirable, but is voluntary at 
present. Therefore, firms in India are under no obligation to disclose their financial derivative 
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activities undertaken to manage their risks. Although not mandatory, the study finds that there 
has been a significant increase of financial derivative disclosures of Indian firms over the years. 
The results show that the stewardship theory explains the determinants of financial derivative 
disclosure in Indian context, and promoters act as stewards and guide their firms to improve their 
financial derivative disclosures. The study shows that the presence of Risk Management 
Committees in a firm lead to better financial derivative disclosures. In addition, if a firm is a 
family business (the promoter or promoter group has a majority share in the firm and are actively 
involved in managing the business), the financial derivative disclosure is better.  
 
In addition, external agencies like institutional shareholders/foreign stakeholders have a 
monitoring effect on a firm. The higher proportion of institutional shareholders in the ownership 
pattern leads to better derivative disclosure. In addition, when a firm has higher foreign income 
(a proxy for foreign operations and foreign stakeholders), again, the financial derivative 
disclosure is better. This conforms to the monitoring role of stewards, in this case, external 
agencies, in their role to push firms to improve their derivative disclosure. 
Size of the firm and the value of derivatives used are also significant determinants of financial 
derivative disclosures in India. 
 
CONCLUSION  
There have been significant steps by regulatory bodies across the world to increase the effective 
of governance especially in increasing the transparency of financial reporting. Transparency in 
financial reporting is imperative as it provides a true picture of an organization to its 
stakeholders. Transparency in reporting financial derivative holdings of an organisation is 
essential as the use of financial derivatives has the potential to increase the overall risk of the 
organization manifold. By far derivatives research has predominately been based on western 
developed economies; little has been known about reporting and disclosing of derivatives from 
developing economies. The motivation of this study is to fill the research gap with the primary 
aim to assessing the determinants of financial derivative disclosures in India – one of the largest 
developing economies in the world. This empirical study models the factors that determine 
Financial Derivative Disclosure of Indian non-financial firms The study develops a self-
constructed unweighted Financial Derivative Disclosure Index (FDDI) to measure the derivative 
disclosure. The sample represents companies from Nifty 50, out of which banking and financial 
services companies were removed. Using multiple regression model, this study modelled the 
corporate governance factors which determine derivative disclosure. The factors identified were 
presence of usage of derivatives, size, foreign income, presence of risk management committee, 
institutional shareholding and binary variable for family business. The results show that the 
stewardship theory explains the determinants of financial derivative disclosure in Indian context, 
and promoters act as stewards and guide their firms to improve their financial derivative 
disclosures. 
 
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The following are limitations of the study: firstly, data availability was a major limitation as 
many firms did not disclose the notional value of the derivatives used by them. Secondly, the 
usual limitations of financial statements and annual reports apply to this study as well. 
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